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REMAKING MAKING: INTEGRATING 
SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 
WITH THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 
Abstract: Self-replicating technologies such as genetically modified organisms 
have unquestionably improved the farming industry. In order to ensure continued 
innovation in this area, the law has increasingly established protections for this 
technology. Although the exhaustion doctrine serves as a limit to a patent hold-
er’s rights, the application of the current patent infringement regime may be 
over-inclusive as self-replicating technologies continue to advance. This Note 
identifies Bowman v. Monsanto as a recent example of how self-replicating pa-
tented products could lead to blanket infringement liability, including for inno-
cent infringers. This Note recommends that the definition of “making” be rede-
fined to include only those who knowingly reproduce a patented article. This 
new, more precise definition of “making” will improve the modern patent in-
fringement framework and successfully integrate self-replicating technologies in-
to the current exhaustion doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, seventy-five year old Vernon Hugh Bowman, a small-scale 
farmer from Indiana, faced Monsanto, one of the most dominant agricultural 
biotechnology companies in the world.1 The case was litigated for four years 
before it reached the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The case presented a unique issue: 
self-replicating technologies, such as Roundup Ready seeds, can independently 
reproduce themselves with minimal human intervention.3 The question was 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Andrew Pollack, Farmer’s Supreme Court Challenge Puts Monsanto Patents at Risk, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/business/supreme-court-to-hear-monsanto-seed-
patent-case.html [https://perma.cc/X993-HS47]. With only three hundred acres of land, Bowman did not 
consider himself as a farmer. Id. 
 2 See Patent Act of 1952—Patent Exhaustion Doctrine—Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 378, 379 (2013); Pollack, supra note 1. In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana rebuffed Vernon Hugh Bowman’s argument that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply to 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds. Patent Act of 1952—Patent Exhaustion Doctrine—Bowman v. 
Monsanto Co., supra, at 379. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s decision, rejecting the theory that self-replicating technologies required special treatment 
outside of the exhaustion doctrine’s traditional application. Id. 
 3 See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765, 1769 (2013) (noting that Bowman’s 
theory that the soybeans replicate on their own fails to recognize the human labor involved, including 
buying the seeds from the grain elevator and spraying the herbicide in order to rid the crop of seeds 
without the Roundup Ready technology); Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and the Chal-
lenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131, 131 (2013). Roundup 
Ready seeds are genetically modified seeds with traits that are transferred into each successive soy-
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whether someone who buys the patent-protected Roundup Ready seeds can 
reproduce the seeds without the patent holder’s consent.4 The Court was tasked 
with determining how to apply existing patent law doctrines to a situation that 
could not have been fathomed at the time the principles were established.5 The 
dispute also highlighted longstanding tensions within patent law between the 
right of inventors to exclusively profit from their creations and the rights of 
purchasers after a legitimate sale.6 
The difficulty of applying patent law to new technologies was initially 
apparent in the Organic Seed Growers’s Association’s (“OSGA”) lawsuit 
against Monsanto in 2012.7 There, OSGA sought to invalidate Monsanto’s pa-
tents and challenge future infringement liability.8 Organic Seed Growers’s 
primary claim was that farmers could be held liable as innocent infringers, 
bringing attention to the merits of patent infringement claims in relation to 
self-replicating technology.9 Currently, liability under patent infringement does 
not require that an infringer have knowledge that a violation has occurred.10 
However, whether patent infringement should use a strict liability standard is 
debatable, since the patent statute does not directly speak to the issue.11 Ulti-
mately, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. highlighted the 
fact that self-replicating technologies have the ability to create copies of them-
                                                                                                                           
bean crop. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 835–36 (S.D. Ind. 2009), aff’d, 657 F.3d 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). Self-replicating technologies are those that have 
the ability to proliferate while they are being used. Id. Such technologies include seeds that have ge-
netic material such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that is encrypted with the guidelines needed to 
replicate itself. Christopher M. Holman, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for the Emerging 
Issue of Patentable Self-Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent Infringement, 80 MO. L. REV. 665, 
670 (2015). 
 4 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 5 See Pollack, supra note 1 (recognizing that, on the one hand, the patenting of living organisms 
is considered unethical and harmful to farmers because of increasing prices, while on the other hand, 
this kind of biotechnology has significantly increased crop yields). 
 6 See id. (noting that critics in the biotechnology industry have argued that the domination and 
power of Monsanto’s patents should be challenged, while supporters of the industry believe that the 
rights of patent holders are well settled). Critics have described Monsanto’s domination in the bio-
technology industry as one that exerts excessive control over farmers and discourages the proliferation 
of other, non-engineered plant varieties. Id. 
 7 See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate twenty-three Monsanto patents). Organic Seed 
Growers is an organization that represents organic farmers and seeks to protect their interests in culti-
vating uncontaminated seed. OSGATA’s Mission, ORGANIC SEED GROWERS & TRADE ASS’N, 
http://www.osgata.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/QAF8-Y383]. 
 8 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1352. 
 9 Id. at 1353. 
 10 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (setting forth only the actual conduct that will be deemed patent 
infringement and remaining silent on the mental state that must accompany the conduct). 
 11 See id. 
2018] Integrating Self-Replicating Technologies 391 
selves with minimal intervention and, consequently, the traditional patent prin-
ciples do not neatly apply.12 
This inevitable issue again came to fruition in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.13 
On its face, Bowman’s argument seemed ill-considered and not one that would 
be granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.14 His argument went 
directly against traditional patent law doctrines, reasoning that purchasers of a 
patented article should be able to make unlimited copies of the product.15 De-
spite what seemed like a meritless argument, Bowman’s situation was unique 
because of the kind of patented article at issue: a genetically modified soybean 
that can independently self-replicate by replanting its seeds.16 
The stakes were extremely high—numerous organizations and individuals 
filed amicus briefs, emphasizing the potential consequences of the decision.17 
On the one hand, organizations such as the American Seed Trade Association, 
CropLife America, and the American Intellectual Property Law Association 
submitted amicus briefs in support of Monsanto’s position, arguing that a deci-
sion in favor of Bowman would not only contradict traditional patent law prin-
ciples, but also have a negative impact on the biotechnology industry.18 On the 
other hand, organizations such as the American Antitrust Institute and the Pub-
lic Patent Foundation supported Bowman’s position, emphasizing the policy 
implications of the case and the unfair advantage companies like Monsanto 
have against small farmers.19 
The Court essentially had two choices.20 If it held in favor of Monsanto, 
the decision had the potential to significantly restructure the relationship be-
tween farmers and companies that sell seeds.21 But, if the Court decided to se-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Holman, supra note 3, at 672 (discussing the evolution of self-replicating technologies, 
their increasing prevalence, and potential implications in the future). 
 13 Id. at 667. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 16 Id. at 1764–65; Holman, supra note 3, at 667. 
 17 Pollack, supra note 1. 
 18 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Seed Trade Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 6, Bow-
man, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 267021, at *17 (representing 700 members partaking in 
the production or distribution elements of the seed industry); Brief for the American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 1, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-
796) 2013 WL 314458, at *1 (representing practicing attorneys and academics involved in intellectual 
property law); Brief of CropLife America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 1, Bowman, 
133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 314456, at *1 (representing the companies that advance, 
make, and disburse biotechnology products). 
 19 Brief of Amici Curiae the American Antitrust Institute et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1–3, 
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 6208274, at *1–3 (focusing on advancing and 
maintaining antitrust law); Brief of the Public Patent Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 1–2, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2012 WL 6219038, at *1–2 (providing legal 
services pertaining to maintaining flexibility within the patent regime). 
 20 See Pollack, supra note 1. 
 21 See id. 
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verely limit the rights of patent holders in favor of the farmers, a multibillion-
dollar industry could be drastically transformed.22 Ultimately, the facts pre-
sented in Bowman were specific enough to allow the Court to rule narrowly, 
concluding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply.23 The Court explicitly 
left open the possibility that a more technologically advanced self-replicating 
invention could warrant a contrary decision in the future.24 As a result, this 
decision left lingering questions that went beyond Bowman.25 Particularly, as 
little to no human intervention becomes prevalent in advanced self-replicating 
biotechnology, it is foreseeable that an emphasis on the infringer’s conduct to 
support patent infringement will be erroneous.26 Further, such a phenomenon 
will call into question the role of strict liability in patent infringement when an 
accused infringer is unaware.27 Confronting these lingering issues before they 
come before a court will help ensure clarity and predictability in this area of 
the law.28 
Part I of this Note traces the development of patent law and the exhaus-
tion doctrine.29 Part II looks to the exhaustion doctrine’s interpretation of 
“making” and the way it affects the scope of the rule.30 It also explains how 
legislation has provided the foundation for the proliferation of agricultural bio-
technology.31 Part III takes a closer look at the role of “making” in the exhaus-
tion doctrine and recommends a new interpretation that requires intent and 
knowledge.32 
I. PATENT PROTECTION AND SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGY 
A. Historically 
Both statutory law and common law have sought to balance the desire to 
promote innovation through incentives, while prioritizing competition.33 The 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id. 
 23 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768 (noting that the holding was limited). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Holman, supra note 3, at 667–68. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. at 700 (noting the patent infringement regime’s silence regarding the requisite mental 
state). 
 28 See Holman, supra note 3, at 668 (recognizing that the decision in Bowman left open the ap-
plicability of patent law to self-replicating technologies); Daryl Lim, Living with Monsanto, 2015 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 559, 563–64 (proposing that based on the decision in Bowman, examination of 
companies such as Monsanto under the doctrines of patent misuse and antitrust law should be based 
on an effect-focused methodology). 
 29 See infra notes 33–179 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 180–245 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 180–245 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 246–310 and accompanying text. 
 33 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2016, VOLUME I: PER-
SPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS, at III-4, III-6 (Mark A. Lemley eds., 2016) [hereinafter IP 
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enduring history of patent law reflects this challenge in a number of ways.34 
For instance, the Republic of Venice’s Venetian Act of 1474 allowed new in-
ventions that met a number of requirements to be registered with the General 
Welfare Board and receive certain privileges.35 It also required that the device 
be perfected and information on its functionality be made available to the Gen-
eral Welfare Board.36 Once these requirements were met, a patent would be 
established, and the owner would have exclusive rights to the invention for ten 
years.37 Initially, many products could only be sold in commerce through spe-
cialized guilds.38 As a result, a major purpose underlying this new patent sys-
tem was to encourage greater competition by allowing those not included in 
the guilds—typically foreigners—to access the market.39 
By the sixteenth century, Great Britain established a patent system similar 
to the one that existed under the Venetian Act.40 They wanted to ensure the ex-
clusive right of any commercial benefits for a set period of time in order to 
incentivize foreign inventors to introduce new technologies to the country.41 As 
this early patent system developed, statutes shifted the decision as to which 
                                                                                                                           
IN THE TECH AGE] (tracing the historical roots of the modern law patent doctrine, beginning with the 
Venetian Act of 1474 to the modern interpretation of the Patent Act, last revised in 1952); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 1842087, at *3 
(questioning the incentives to improve seeds in the absence of patent protection). In Bowman v. Mon-
santo Co., Chief Justice Roberts’ opening question to Bowman’s lawyer was: “Why in the world 
would anybody spend any money to try to improve the seed if as soon as they sold the first one any-
body could grow more and have as many of those seeds as they want?” Id. The Chief Justice’s ques-
tion demonstrates the enduring rationale behind patent law. See id. 
 34 IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-4 to -5, III-9. The Venetian Act of 1474, followed by 
Britain’s Statute of Monopolies of 1624, specifically set forth the exclusive rights of use and creation 
for new inventions for limited time periods, while the modern Patent Act of the United States fluctuat-
ed between lesser and greater protection, depending on the general perspective at the time. Id. 
 35 Id. The Republic of Venice was a state in Italy that existed from the late seventh century until 
approximately 1797. Republic of Venice, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.
newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Republic_of_Venice [https://perma.cc/RLW6-4LSL]. Under the 
Venetian Patent Statute, a patent may be granted for any “new and ingenious device, not previously 
made.” Joanna Kostylo, Commentary on: Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets (1474), PRIMARY 
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/
showRecord?id=commentary_i_1474 [https://perma.cc/GHN9-VH3Y]. 
 36 IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-4 to -5, III-9. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. at III-4 (noting that one of the main reasons patent law was established was to create a 
path for foreigners and others to enter the market of producing new technologies, controlled by the 
sophisticated artisan guilds of Venice); Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of 
Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 
1268–69 (2012) (noting that guilds had a monopoly on the ability to sell new technologies). 
 39 See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 38, at 1268–69 (discussing the guild system under the 
Venetian economy which required that products were exclusively sold through such organizations). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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inventions received patent rights from board members to the English common 
law courts.42 
The adoption of the British legal system in the American colonies includ-
ed this patent law regime.43 The previous system in the colonies proved to be 
unmanageable as each colony created its own set of patent laws.44 Participants 
in the Constitutional Convention therefore drafted Clause 8, located within 
Article I, Section 8.45 This provision established the legal protection of various 
inventions through patent rights and serves as the authority for today’s intellec-
tual property regime.46 
Despite patent law’s deep and historical roots, the simplicity underlying 
the doctrine has endured.47 Under a modern patent law framework, an inventor 
is afforded exclusive rights to the invention for a specific time period, includ-
ing the right to prevent others from replicating it or using it in a way that un-
dermines the inventor’s ability to profit from it.48 However, as technology de-
velops, applying this seemingly straightforward doctrine is increasingly diffi-
cult.49 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See id. The conferring of patent rights came to be seen as a “royal favor” by the seventeenth 
century. Id. In direct response to this phenomenon, the British Parliament created a new law, which 
empowered the common law courts with the ability to review patents. Id. 
 43 See IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-6. 
 44 Id. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision grants Congress the power to “promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Id. 
 46 Id.; see IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-6. The constitutional provision authorized 
Congress to allow for exclusive rights to be awarded for new inventions for a limited time period. IP 
IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-6. As a result, Congress passed the Patent Act in 1790, which 
included few particulars outsides of the scope of protection, time period, and solution for when the 
rights have been infringed. Id. As a result, the Patent Act of 1793 was then established, which focused 
less on the usefulness of inventions and more on the newly created registration system for new dis-
coveries. Id. at III-7. After becoming increasingly robust after a revision in 1836, the Patent Act’s last 
major revision in 1952 represented a focus on the original principles of patent law. Id. at III-7 to -9. 
 47 IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-6. 
 48 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (detailing the conduct that will be considered patent infringement); 
IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-4 to -5. The Venetian Act of 1474 afforded exclusive rights 
to an inventor for a term of ten years with the right to sue an infringer in court, while Britain’s Statute 
of Monopolies of 1624 allowed for a monopoly of fourteen years. IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, 
at III-4 to -5. 
 49 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. Because the case dealt with a self-replicating technology, the 
Court in Bowman argued against traditional patent law principles, reasoning that after an authorized 
sale, a purchaser is allowed to create and supply copies of the product. Id. This stands in stark contrast 
to patent law, which is premised on preventing others from making duplicates of their invention. Id.; 
see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 (2013) (determin-
ing whether naturally occurring DNA sequences are patentable); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (determining whether a diagnostics test that measured me-
tabolites was patentable subject matter). 
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B. Exhaustion Doctrine 
The exhaustion doctrine is a judicially created legal principle that contin-
ues to develop.50 It rests on the belief that, although the law should provide 
incentives for technological developments, any subsequent rewards should be 
limited in order to achieve further innovation.51 The Court first defined the 
exhaustion doctrine in Adams v. Burke, establishing that there is a limit to a 
patentee’s reward.52 Courts later modified the doctrine’s scope, as restrictions 
on the use of patent holders’s inventions became acceptable.53 As it became 
more complex to apply the rule, courts began to clarify the exhaustion doc-
trine’s limits while reexamining patent holders’s rights.54 
The exhaustion doctrine states that an initial approved sale of a patented 
item exhausts any further rights the patent holder has to that item.55 In other 
words, after a sale, the buyers have the right to use or sell the item in any way 
they wish.56 Beginning in the early nineteenth century, a series of court deci-
sions defined and expanded the exhaustion doctrine.57 Still, the scope of the 
exhaustion doctrine is limited, as it does not allow the buyer to reconstruct or 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Holman, supra note 3, at 667; see Lim, supra note 28, at 561, 571–73 (discussing the ongoing 
development of the exhaustion doctrine under Bowman); see also Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: 
Justices to Consider Limits on “Exhaustion” of Patent Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/argument-preview-justices-consider-limits-exhaustion-patent-
rights/ [https://perma.cc/7HGB-UDUT] (discussing the upcoming opportunity for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to expand or limit the exhaustion doctrine). Recently, in Impressions Products v. Lexmark In-
ternational, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with two issues. 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 
(2017). First, whether Lexmark’s decision to sell its product under an agreement that restricts a pur-
chaser’s rights still exhausted its patent rights, and second, whether its patent rights were exhausted 
when the product was sold overseas. Id. The Court concluded that, on both issues, Lexmark’s patent 
rights were exhausted once the product was sold, regardless of any post-sale restrictions. Id. 
 51 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasizing the promotion of innovative and technological 
endeavors); Lim, supra note 28, at 561–63, 638 (demonstrating the application through Bowman). 
 52 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873). 
 53 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709–10 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that 
licensing restrictions did not exceed the scope of patent rights). 
 54 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008) (finding that where the 
sale of a patented article encompasses the patent, rights of the patentee are exhausted); United States 
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248–49 (1942) (finding that downstream restrictions within a li-
censing scheme exceed the scope of patent rights). 
 55 Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 625; Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 229, 233 (2013). The exhaustion doctrine is also known as the “first sale doc-
trine.” Sheff, supra, at 233. 
 56 Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 626; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 
243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
 57 See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 621 (expanding the exhaustion doctrine to include 
downstream purchasers of patents that encompass most of the patent); Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 
250–51 (clarifying the exhaustion doctrine as not applicable to particular licensing schemes); Adams, 
84 U.S. at 456 (defining the exhaustion doctrine as a restriction on the patent holders’s rights after an 
authorized sale). 
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make a copy of the item regardless of whether there has been a bona fide 
sale.58 
The exhaustion doctrine closely tracks the underlying policy goals of pa-
tent law: to encourage future innovation and advancement through new inven-
tions.59 Further, by limiting the period an inventor can take advantage of cer-
tain privileges, the law still allows for competition.60 Therefore, once the in-
ventor has been rightfully rewarded, such as with monetary compensation, the 
public should have access to the information needed to replicate the invention 
and innovate further.61 This doctrine has continued to evolve, as the courts 
have tried to keep up with modernization.62 
1. Defining the Exhaustion Doctrine 
The exhaustion doctrine was established in Adams v. Burke, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the question of how far a patent holder’s 
privilege extends.63 Adams was assigned a patent for coffin lids and was li-
censed to sell them exclusively within a ten-mile radius of Boston.64 After dis-
covering that Burke, an undertaker, was using the coffin lids outside of the des-
ignated area, Adams brought a patent infringement case against him.65 The 
Court made clear that the rights of a patent holder and the purchaser’s rights 
after a sale were distinct.66 The Court emphasized that once a sale was 
achieved and the patent holders receive the full value of their invention, the 
purchaser could use the product without restriction.67 
Although the Adams decision defined the exhaustion doctrine, the Court 
continued to rely on the idea that patent holders receive “all the royalty” once a 
sale was achieved.68 Twenty years after Adams, the Court again grappled with 
post-sale restrictions in Hobbie v. Jennison.69 Owners of a patent that improved 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to reconstructing a patented article). 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 626. 
 60 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (explicitly stating that rights are for a limited period of time); 
Sheff, supra note 55, at 233 (noting that the time limitation was intended to promote innovation). 
 61 IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-4. 
 62 See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 621 (focusing on whether the exhaustion doctrine 
applied to method patents). 
 63 Adams, 84 U.S. at 456. 
 64 Id. at 454. The initial owner of the patent was a company called Merrill & Homer. Id. It as-
signed its rights to Lockhart & Seeyle, which subsequently assigned those rights to Adams. Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 455. 
 67 Id. at 456. 
 68 Lim, supra note 3, at 164. 
 69 See 149 U.S. 355, 355–56, 360–61 (1893) (concluding that the restrictions imposed on the 
defendants exceeded the scope of patent privileges). Here, the plaintiffs owned patents for the en-
hancements of pipes in relation to gas and water, among other things. Id. They sued Jennison, who 
was found using the technology in the Connecticut area. Id. 
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piping for gas and water sued for patent infringement, alleging that the defend-
ant was using their patented technology within the geographic area where they 
held exclusive rights.70 Ultimately, the Court relied on the reasoning used in 
Adams—that a sale affords the patent holder certain rewards and the holder 
should not receive benefits beyond that.71 
2. Contracting Around the Exhaustion Doctrine 
As the courts consistently articulated the exhaustion of patent privileges 
after a sale, patent holders found ways to circumvent this principle through 
licensing structures.72 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. 
demonstrates the way in which patent holders adopted licensing schemes to 
control the use of their patented inventions by manufacturers.73 General Talk-
ing Pictures Corporation had a patent for amplifiers used in theatres that it li-
censed to the Transformer Company, allowing the Transformer Company to 
make and sell the amplifiers for noncommercial uses.74 The alleged patent in-
fringers, Western Electric Company, bought the amplifiers from the Trans-
former Company and used them for commercial purposes, despite notice of the 
license and its restricted uses.75 Resultantly, General Talking Corporation’s 
rights were not exhausted.76 The Court found that licensing agreements did not 
amount to an impermissible extension of patent privileges, despite the fact that 
the patent holder was exerting control over end users of the product.77 
In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the Court again extended the abil-
ity to contract around the exhaustion doctrine through licensing arrangements 
made directly with the users of patented inventions.78 Mallinckrodt manufac-
tured a patented device that assisted in the diagnosis and treatment of pulmo-
nary disease.79 Despite the fact that the device was supposed to be used only 
once, hospitals sent the used and contaminated apparatuses to Medipart, which 
then sterilized the apparatuses and returned them.80 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 355. 
 71 Id. at 363. 
 72 See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180–81 (1938). 
 73 See id. at 180 (describing the licensing notice scheme of the sale of amplifiers which restricted 
the subsequent sale and use by purchasers); Sheff, supra note 55, at 233–34 (detailing the general 
licensing schemes that allow patent holders to contract around the exhaustion doctrine). 
 74 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 179–80. 
 75 See id. at 180 (noting that the defendants were aware of the Transformer Company’s licensing 
restrictions). 
 76 Id. at 181. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See 976 F.2d at 709 (concluding that a patent sold under a valid license, within the scope of the 
patent, is valid); Sheff, supra note 55, at 234 (describing the significance of the Court’s conclusion in 
Mallinckrodt, which created contract and patent infringement liability). 
 79 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701. 
 80 Id. at 702. 
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The Court held that Medipart’s disregard of Mallinckrodt’s single use re-
quirement constituted patent infringement.81 In reaching the holding, the Court 
distinguished other cases that had comparable requirements and were found to 
be price-fixing schemes.82 Price-fixing schemes were ways in which patent 
holders tried to reap a greater reward than they were entitled to.83 These 
schemes were at odds with the exhaustion doctrine’s principle because the re-
quirements were found to be too restrictive.84 Drawing on Adams, the Court 
characterized the conditional sale of Mallinckrodt’s device to hospitals as one 
in which the company did not actually receive its full reward at the point of 
sale.85 The Court reasoned that Adams never actually stated that restrictions or 
conditions could not be placed on sales.86 Rather, the Court emphasized the 
rights of patent holders and users where a sale with conditions took place.87 As 
a result, Mallinckrodt’s restrictions on the use of the device were within the 
scope of its patent rights.88 
3. Clarifying the Exhaustion Doctrine 
Increasingly complex patents and licensing structures forced courts to fur-
ther clarify the exhaustion doctrine.89 For instance, in United States v. Univis 
Lens Co., Univis Lens Company (“Univis”) was the patent holder of multifocal 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 708; see Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500 (1917) (finding that a 
notice requiring a minimum transfer price could not be considered a license or a restriction on the use 
of the product, which would have been within the scope of their patent, but rather, a price-fixing 
scheme); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913) (concluding that a notice requiring that 
any subsequent sale of the article cost less than a dollar exceeded the scope of patent rights). 
 83 Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 507, 514–15 (concluding that guidelines requiring 
purchasers to use the movie projectors solely with films leased by the patentee was a price-fixing 
restriction outside the scope of patent rights). 
 84 See Straus, 243 U.S. at 499 (concluding that the scheme was clearly for price-fixing purposes 
and not to protect the patent holder’s rights); Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 515 (finding that 
the license restrictions were inconsistent with the actual rights of a patent holder); Bauer & Cie, 229 
U.S. at 16 (finding that denoting the sale as a license was fraudulent). 
 85 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. The lens blank did not embody the patent because the patent 
was only for the finished product—glasses. Id. As a result of restricting the device to a single use, the 
price of the invention did not equate to what it would have been if a bona fide sale had taken place. Id. 
As such, the conditional sale could be seen as a discount and not the full reward Mallinckrodt was 
entitled to as the patent holder. Id.; see Adams, 84 U.S. at 456 (emphasizing that a patent holder 
should receive nothing more or less of their full reward); Lim, supra note 3, at 164 (describing the 
Court’s determination that liability for patent infringement was warranted as long as the patent holder 
did not receive full consideration for their product). 
 86 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708. 
 87 Id.; see Adams, 84 U.S. at 455. 
 88 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709. 
 89 See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 622–24 (describing the multiple patents encompassed 
within the licensing scheme); Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 243–44 (detailing the multi-step licensing 
scheme for a patent on eyeglasses). 
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lenses.90 To create the lenses, Univis only manufactured the lens blanks and 
licensed the subsequent steps to third parties, but continued to hold the patent 
for the completed version of the lenses.91 These steps included grinding and 
polishing the lenses and adding the prescription.92 At every step of the process, 
Univis determined the price of the transaction and licensees were unable to 
deviate from them.93 
Univis reasoned that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply to its licensing 
scheme because the sales of the lens blanks to finishing and prescription retail-
ers were not completed versions of the patent and, resultantly, did not trigger a 
sale.94 Ultimately, the Court concluded that, although the lens blanks did not 
completely embody the patent, the blanks embodied the most important as-
pects.95 Therefore, once the blanks were sold to the wholesaler, retailer, or pre-
scription retailer for completion, Univis’s rights were exhausted.96 
The courts have continued to define licensing structures as a means of ex-
tending patent privileges.97 In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 
LG Electronics (“LGE”) licensed to Intel Corporation, Inc. (“Intel”) the ability 
to build computer microprocessors and chipsets.98 Intel later sold the micro-
processors and chipsets to Quanta Computer, Inc. (“Quanta”).99 Quanta then 
combined the items with non-Intel products in violation of the licensing 
agreement with LGE.100 
The Court followed Univis Lens Co. and held in favor of Quanta on the 
grounds that the only feasible purpose of the microprocessors and chipsets was 
to be used within a computer system.101 As a result, microprocessors and chip-
sets completely embodied the most important aspects of the patent, which 
made the exhaustion doctrine applicable to sales to third parties such as Quan-
ta.102 
                                                                                                                           
 90 316 U.S. at 243–44. 
 91 Id. at 244. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 245. 
 94 Id. at 250–51 (rejecting Univis Lens Co.’s argument that because the licenses were for incom-
plete articles, a sale has not occurred). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 250. 
 97 See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 621 (concluding that, because the licenses allowed the 
sale of the most essential elements of the patents, the exhaustion doctrine was applicable). 
 98 Id. at 623. Generally, computers operate through the use of microprocessors, which communi-
cate information to a chipset. Id. at 621. The chipset is connected to the microprocessor through a 
group of wires, also known as a “bus,” and transfers data from the microprocessor to computer sup-
port accessories. Id. 
 99 Id. at 623. 
 100 Id. at 624. 
 101 Id. at 633–34. 
 102 Id. at 638. 
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Courts are repeatedly tasked with determining where the rights of patent 
holders begin and end due to the increased use of licensing schemes.103 As a 
result, the courts willingly tweak the scope of the exhaustion doctrine in a way 
that continues to track overall patent goals and reward innovation while simul-
taneously limiting how far the privileges can extend.104 
C. Statutory Analysis: Historical Interpretation of the Patent Act 
The Patent Act gives patent holders the exclusive right to “make, use or 
sell” their invention.105 The legislature did not explicitly define these terms 
anywhere in the statute.106 Therefore, the door is still open for judicial interpre-
tation of terms such as “make.”107 
Judicial interpretation of the term “use” exemplifies the manner in which 
courts have tackled the challenge of interpreting the statute.108 For example, in 
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit noted that the lack of a statutory definition of “use” allowed 
for a particularly broad interpretation.109 As a result, the court reasoned that it 
could expand the definition as it saw fit.110 Another example of a court broadly 
interpreting the Patent Act was in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson 
Pavement Co., where the U.S. Supreme Court had to define “public use” in 
determining whether an invention met the statutory requirements for patent 
protection.111 The Court found that minimal utilization by the public did not 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See id. (emphasizing that a sale of products that practice a patent in its entirety, or close 
enough to it, will be considered a sale and exhaust patent privileges). 
 104 See id. at 628–29 (emphasizing that method patents are not shielded from the application of 
the exhaustion doctrine); Adams, 84 U.S. at 456 (concluding that, when the appropriate reward is 
received for a patent holder’s invention, any rights regarding use or sale are exhausted). 
 105 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 106 Id.; see Holman, supra note 3, at 698. After a legitimate sale has been made, the exhaustion 
doctrine prevents patent holders from controlling the use or subsequent sale of an invention. Bowman, 
133 S. Ct. at 1768. It does not, however, give a purchaser of the invention the right to make a copy of 
the invention. Id.; see Adams, 84 U.S. at 456 (defining the exhaustion doctrine for the first time). 
 107 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768 (concluding that the Court’s decision, which found that 
Bowman had made another article, was narrow and could be subject to change in the future). 
 108 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics, Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 16 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Holman, supra note 3, at 698. 
 109 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see Holman, supra 
note 3, at 698 (noting that case law with respect to the definition of use, making, or selling with re-
spect to the patent statute). 
 110 Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 861. 
 111 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 
(1877) (finding that as long as the inventor was genuinely testing their invention the Court would not 
find public use). Public use is defined as the ability of the general population to utilize the invention. 
City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134; Holman, supra note 3, at 699. 
2018] Integrating Self-Replicating Technologies 401 
satisfy the “use” requirement, resulting in a judicially-created exception for 
experimentation.112 
D. Self-Replicating Agricultural Biotechnology and Legal Protection 
1. Self-Replicating Technology 
Patented inventions that self-replicate pose a significant difficulty for pa-
tent law.113 As emphasized in Adams v. Burke, the goal of patent law is to allow 
inventors to obtain their rightful reward, which is traditionally some monetary 
benefit.114 This goal is based on the rationale that an immense amount of re-
search and development is invested into patented inventions.115 Accordingly, 
the compensation and privileges the accompany a patent incentivizes innova-
tion.116 
It is debatable whether a patent holder of a self-replicating technology is 
deprived of their reward when there are subsequent copies of their product, 
creating a tension between patent holders and the users of their products.117 
Specifically, if a patent holder sells a product that has the ability to create an-
other copy of itself with little to no human intervention, then every purchaser 
becomes a new challenger in their market.118 Patent holders may therefore be 
incentivized to control the use of their products beyond a sale, potentially vio-
lating the exhaustion doctrine.119 
An article is self-replicating if it is an invention that can be reproduced 
through its own processes.120 This phenomenon is almost exclusively seen in 
agricultural biotechnology due to the natural duplicating features of living or-
                                                                                                                           
 112 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135; Holman, supra note 3, at 699. 
 113 See Lim, supra note 3, at 168–69 (describing the inherent issues of aligning the abilities of 
self-replicating technologies with traditional patent law). 
 114 Id. 
 115 IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-17. 
 116 Holman, supra note 3, at 668; Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of 
Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 119–20 (2007). 
 117 See Lim, supra note 3, at 131 (noting that the prevalence of self-replicating technologies cre-
ates a conflict between creators and their consumers); Savich, supra note 116, at 115 (describing the 
issue of deprivation of reward as applied to farming). 
 118 See Savich, supra note 116, at 115. Every purchaser of a self-replicating product has the abil-
ity to become a competitor because the purchaser will now have unfiltered access to multiple versions 
of that product without liability. Id. 
 119 See id. at 122 (describing the use of licensing restrictions by patent holders to avoid the ex-
haustion doctrine). 
 120 See Holman, supra note 3, at 670 (describing how plants self-replicate naturally). The idea of 
self-replicating technology reproducing without intervention is up for debate, as one could argue that 
human labor, such as harvesting, as well as “sun, soil, water and nutrients” are inextricable aspects of 
the process. Id. 
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ganisms.121 Self-replicating biotechnology is created using genetic material 
such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which is encrypted with its own replica-
tion instructions.122 A crop is “genetically modified” when the composition of 
the genetic material is altered to combine genes with specific traits.123 These 
traits are typically selected to serve a specific purpose. 124 
These genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”) have significantly revo-
lutionized certain areas such as farming.125 For instance, advances in seed 
technology—particularly soybean crops—have significantly increased crop 
yields.126 They have also lessened the detrimental effects of farming, particu-
larly in relation to decreasing soil erosion and chemical usage.127 
2. Legal Protection for Agricultural Biotechnology 
Although agricultural biotechnology has advanced quickly and dramati-
cally, patent protection for seeds has evolved slowly over time.128 The privati-
zation of the seed industry can be traced back to 1885, when lobbyists first 
urged the government to legally protect the discoveries acquired by exploring 
plant varieties.129 Initially, the government distributed seed varieties for free, 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Christopher M. Holman in Support of Respondents 
at 5, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 314459, at *5 (noting that self-replicating 
technologies are not neatly analogous to other inventions). 
 122 See Holman, supra note 3, at 670. Professor Holman suggests the useful comparison of agri-
cultural biotechnology to computer software to further understand how self-replication works. Id. 
Computer software is encrypted with code that facilitates its replication by serving as blueprints for 
subsequent copies. Id. Similarly, DNA in genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”) are comparable 
to a “code” that, with some outside help, creates exact duplicates. Id. 
 123 See Genetically Modified Foods and Organisms, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://theliteratesims.net/eng1bM/Readings/gmfoodsandorganisms.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPK6-
4XGJ]. 
 124 David Daniel, Note, Seeds of Hope: How New Genetic Technologies May Increase Value to 
Farmers, Seed Companies, and the Developing World, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 250, 
251 (2010). 
 125 See Lim, supra note 28, at 566 (describing the benefits of GMOs as well as the innovation of 
seed varieties, their early predecessors). Early development in agricultural biotechnology spearheaded 
by companies such as Pioneer Hi-Bred led to a six-fold increase in crop yields within a century. Hol-
man, supra note 3, at 676. 
 126 See Daniel, supra note 124, at 251. Soybeans are the second most planted crop in the United 
States, encompassing over 200,000 farms and nearly 80 million acres. Lim, supra note 3, at 138. They 
are used as feed for livestock and are an ingredient in a number of food products. Id. 
 127 See Lim, supra note 28, at 566. Through advancing agricultural biotechnology, crops includ-
ing wheat, rice, corn, and others have benefited while simultaneously reducing harm to the land and 
the environment, such as through decreased insecticide usage. See id. 
 128 See id. (noting that legal protection for seed varieties began in 1930); infra notes 161–179 
(describing the superiority of patent protection for plant varieties). 
 129 See Lim, supra note 3, at 141. The potential of commercializing the seed industry began to be 
realized in the late nineteenth century as companies increasingly invested in developing new plant 
varieties, such as hybrid crops. Id. This development was a result of two forces at work. Id. The first 
was that the plant varieties created high yielding crops. Id. Second, since these high yields could not 
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which caused a lack of incentive on the part of plant breeders to invest in the 
industry.130 In an effort to encourage agricultural research investments, the De-
partment of Agriculture ended the government-mandated seed program in the 
early twentieth century.131 
In 1906, legislation was introduced to bring plant variety innovations un-
der the trademark regime.132 The theory was that plant breeders did not have 
the requisite incentive to create new varieties because purchasers could not 
identify any given seed’s breeder.133 Legislators believed that trademark pro-
tection was the solution because it would grant breeders the opportunity to reg-
ister the name of novel plant varieties.134 In actuality, trademark protection was 
not an adequate solution to incentivizing breeders to spend the requisite time, 
energy, and funds to invest in further innovation.135 
3. The Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act 
Eventually, legislation was enacted to encourage investments in the plant 
variety industry.136 The first statute was the Plant Patent Act (“PPA”), which 
was enacted in 1930.137 The PPA created a patent regime that was limited to 
asexually reproducing plants.138 Consequently, the PPA was narrow in scope 
                                                                                                                           
be replicated through traditional seed saving techniques, it created a reliable customer base of farmers 
year after year. Id. at 140–41. 
 130 See Lim, supra note 28, at 566. Early pioneers within the seed industry tried to protect their 
products as trade secrets, another regime within patent law. Lim, supra note 3, at 141. Ultimately, this 
tactic proved unsuccessful because sexually produced plants naturally create distinguishing character-
istics. Id. 
 131 See Lim, supra note 3, at 141. The government wanted to encourage private investment in the 
agricultural industry believing that privatization spurs innovation because of the available commercial 
incentive of selling that product. See id. 
 132 See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . . ?, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 727, 731 (2002) (recognizing that, because seeds were distributed freely, it created no 
commercial incentive for potential inventors to devote the necessary research and money to discover 
new plant varieties). 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. at 732. 
 136 Lim, supra note 28, at 566; see Michelle Ma, Comment, Anticipating and Reducing the Un-
fairness of Monsanto’s Inadvertent Infringement Lawsuits: A Proposal to Import Copyright Law’s 
Notice-and-Takedown Regime into the Seed Patent Context, 100 CAL. L. REV 691, 696–97 (2012) 
(discussing the evolution of the Plant Patent Act (“PPA”) and the Plant Variety Protection Act 
(“PVPA”) and their inherent issues). 
 137 Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 161–164 (2012)); Janis & Kesan, supra note 132, at 735. 
 138 See Lim, supra note 28, at 566. Asexual reproduction involves only one parent and results in 
one offspring that is a clone of the parent. Ma, supra note 136, at 696–97. Because GMOs typically 
involve sexual reproduction by two parents, the PPA was not particularly helpful in encouraging in-
novation in that area. Id. at 697. 
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because much of the plant variety industry involved sexually reproducing 
plants.139 
The primary issue was that the legislature wanted to incentivize breeders 
to create new varieties, but did not intend to provide any patent-like protec-
tions to new varieties of particular seeds.140 Ultimately, the PPA did not pro-
vide effective protections needed for contemporary agricultural biotechnolo-
gy.141 Modern-day seed products focus on traits by combining two plants to 
create a progeny that contains features of both parents.142 Despite this, the 
PPA’s adoption was still significant because it established that plant life was 
patentable subject matter.143 
In 1970, the Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”) established the legal 
protection that modern agricultural biotechnology inventors sought.144 Similar 
to the PPA, the PVPA allowed inventors to obtain a plant variety protection 
certificate (“PVP certificate”), which was easier to obtain than a patent.145 The 
most significant difference between a PPA and PVP certificate was that a PVP 
certificate gave protection to sexually reproduced plant varieties.146 Also, the 
PVP certificate allowed its holder to prevent others from commercializing the 
protected plant variety in any manner.147 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Janis & Kesan, supra note 132, at 735; Ma, supra note 136, at 697. Congress placed an em-
phasis on the human effort it took to create new asexual plant varieties and wanted to encourage this 
kind of activity. See Janis & Kesan, supra note 132, at 735. The focus on the creation of asexual varie-
ties rather than sexually producing varieties meant that the seed industry did not significantly benefit 
from the PPA in comparison to areas such as the nursery industry. See id.; see also Imazio Nursery, 
Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d. 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (distinguishing patent protection as 
applicable only to asexually produced plants, while sexually produced plants received only PVPA 
protection). 
 140 Janis & Kesan, supra note 132, at 735. 
 141 See Ma, supra note 136, at 696. The PPA is still in effect. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2012). 
 142 See Ma, supra note 136, at 696. 
 143 See Lim, supra note 3, at 141. 
 144 Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended 
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2012)); see Lim, supra note 3, at 141–42 (discussing how the PVPA pro-
vided protection for sexually reproduced plant varieties, in contrast to the PPA); Ma, supra note 136, 
at 697 (detailing how the PVPA’s patent-like protections, including the ability to exclude others from 
selling or using the material in any manner, were beneficial to the seed industry). 
 145 See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (requiring only that breeders file an application for protection and follow 
subsequent procedures of approval); 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012) (requiring that a patent meet sub-
ject matter standards, in addition to novelty and non-obviousness criteria, pursuant to the Patent Act); 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (discussing the ra-
tionale for more stringent patent requirements, which affords patent holders greater protections). Ad-
ditionally, to be granted a patent, the inventor must include a written explanation of the article that 
allows others to replicate the product. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 142. In contrast, to acquire a 
plant variety protection certificate, the inventor does not have to meet the same requirements as a 
patent. Id. 
 146 Ma, supra note 136, at 697. 
 147 Id. 
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Although a PVP certificate gave certificate holders exclusive rights, it 
stopped short of granting the broad privileges afforded to patent holders in two 
ways.148 First, farmers who legally bought seeds protected under a PVP certifi-
cate were allowed to save the seeds for replanting in subsequent harvests, sig-
nificantly reducing the commercial potential for certificate holders.149 Second, 
in an effort to promote further innovation, researchers were allowed to use pro-
tected seeds without compensating the inventors.150 The rationale for these two 
exemptions was the desire to further advance the plant variety industry while 
recognizing inventors’s desire to profit from their products.151 
The courts quickly recognized that the PVPA’s exceptions were undesira-
ble.152 In Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit struck down the PVPA exception that allowed for seed 
saving, concluding that it did not align with the law’s goals.153 The court high-
lighted that allowing farmers to save seeds significantly reduced the breeder’s 
incentive to invest further in plant varieties.154 Rather, the farmers began in-
vesting in hybrid crops, which were not as easy to replicate in subsequent har-
vesting seasons.155 
After the court’s decision in Delta & Pine Land Co., Congress amended 
the PVPA to prohibit farmers who bought protected seed from selling it to oth-
er farmers.156 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, a U.S. Supreme Court case, went 
further in limiting the PVPA’s exceptions by allowing farmers to only save the 
seeds they intended to personally use.157 
The PPA and PVPA were a significant step in providing legal protections 
to self-replicating technology such as plant varieties, but were largely unsuc-
cessful.158 Although the courts stepped in and the legislature amended the 
PVPA to increase the commercial viability of innovation in the breeding indus-
                                                                                                                           
 148 Lim, supra note 3, at 142. 
 149 See id.; Ma, supra note 136, at 697. Farmers’s ability to save seeds was also known as “bin 
run” or “brown bag sales,” which ultimately created a competitor for plant breeders with each sale. 
Lim, supra note 3, at 142. 
 150 Ma, supra note 136, at 697. 
 151 See Lim, supra note 3, at 143. 
 152 See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995) (limiting PVPA exceptions 
relating to personal use); Lim, supra note 3, at 144 (noting the changes to the PVPA resulting from 
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation and congressional amendments). 
 153 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Lim, supra note 3, at 143. 
 156 Id. at 144. 
 157 See Asgrow Seed Co., 513 U.S. at 192 (concluding that “brown bag” saving was limited to 
harvests designated for a farmer’s personal use). 
 158 See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in Fur-
therance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 155 (2005) (describing the limited suc-
cess of early legal protection for plant varieties). 
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try, it seemingly did not go far enough.159 Eventually, the achievement of full 
patent protection for seeds caused these plant protection regimes to fall to the 
wayside.160 
E. Patent Protection 
The Patent Act, enacted in 1952, provides the statutory requirements in-
ventors must satisfy in order to be conferred the exclusive rights to “make, use 
. . . or sell” their invention.161 Specifically, section 101 sets out the types of 
subject matter that can be patented, including processes also known as utility 
patents.162 The subsequent sections set forth detailed requirements, including 
that the invention be useful, original, and non-obvious, and that the patentee 
adhere to certain disclosure requirements that will allow others to use the in-
vention once the patent term expires.163 Once these requirements are met, pa-
tentees are given privileges that allow them to reap the full commercial reward 
from their innovation, subject to limitations such as the exhaustion doctrine.164 
Given the extensive rights available under patent law, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s inclusion of seed technology within this regime was a game-
changer.165 The Court first took on this issue in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.166 
There, the Court was tasked with determining whether a patent could be grant-
ed to a genetically engineered bacterium that had the ability to separate crude 
oil and could be used to clear oil spills.167 The patent application included a 
claim for bacteria, which was initially rejected.168 The rationale was that bacte-
ria, as creations of nature, were living things and therefore not within the scope 
of patentable subject matter.169 Relying on statutory interpretation techniques 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Lim, supra note 3, at 143–44. 
 160 See Janis & Kesan, supra note 132, at 776 (finding that the statutory regimes created for plant 
protection has been outpaced by the more broad, far-reaching rights allowed under patent law). 
 161 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271(a) (2012). 
 162 Id. § 101. 
 163 Id. §§ 101–103, 112; IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra note 33, at III-10 to -11 (detailing the statu-
tory requirements for a patent). 
 164 35 U.S.C. § 271; see Adams, 84 U.S. at 456 (establishing that the exclusive rights given to 
patent holders are subject to limitations under the exhaustion doctrine); IP IN THE TECH AGE, supra 
note 33, at III-12 (noting the privileges bestowed on a patent holder). 
 165 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308, 318 (1980) (finding that living organisms 
were patentable subject matter); Holman, supra note 3, at 674 (noting that, prior to the decision in 
Chakrabarty, it was unclear whether plants and seeds could receive patent protection, but resulted in 
increased investment). There are conflicting views of the role of patent law in spurring innovation. See 
William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1912 (2013) 
(arguing that the U.S. policy towards a strong patent regime creates a disadvantage against foreign 
rivals). 
 166 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
 167 See id. at 305–06. 
 168 See id. at 306. 
 169 Id. 
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and legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress intended for patent-
able subject matter to be broad under the Patent Act.170 The inclusion of bacte-
ria within the scope of protected subject matter marked the beginning of a new 
industry.171 
Almost twenty years after Chakrabarty, the Court reaffirmed its broad in-
terpretation of the Patent Act in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred In-
ternational, Inc.172 Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. brought suit against 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. for patent infringement after discovering that its hybrid 
seeds were resold in violation of a licensing agreement.173 Relying on 
Chakrabarty, the Court rejected J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.’s argument that the 
PPA and PVPA served as an exception to the broad interpretation of section 
101.174 It explicitly concluded that sexually reproducing plants were patentable 
subject matter under the Patent Act.175 
In enacting the PPA and PVPA, the legislature made notable progress to-
wards protecting new agricultural biotechnology.176 However, the lack of pro-
tection for sexually produced plants, in conjunction with exceptions for per-
sonal replanting of seeds and research, denied inventors the incentives availa-
ble through patent protection.177 The Court’s decisions had a profound effect 
on the agricultural biotechnology industry as a whole and on seed development 
in particular.178 In fact, the Court’s decision in Chakrabarty led to the approval 
of 1,800 utility patent applications and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. incentivized de-
velopment of GMOs.179 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See id. at 309. The Court concluded that the use of terminology such as “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 101 could be interpreted to mean that Congress wanted the 
statute to be far-reaching. Id. at 308. 
 171 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 145 (noting that the decision in Chakrabarty led to 
nearly 2000 patents for plants); Ma, supra note 136, at 698 (noting that the broad interpretation of the 
statute led to innovation in the biotechnology industry). 
 172 See 534 U.S. at 145 (concluding that hybrid corn seeds are patentable subject matter); Ma, 
supra note 136, at 698 (noting that the decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. made clear that sexually 
reproduced plants were covered within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 173 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 128. 
 174 Id. at 129, 145–46. 
 175 Id. at 145. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 534 U.S. at 141; see Lim, supra note 3, at 141–42 (noting that the PPA gave patent pro-
tection to asexually produced seeds, endorsing it as patentable subject matter, while the PVPA gave 
legal protection to sexually produced plants). 
 178 See Lim, supra note 28, at 567–68 (noting the increased benefits and yields of plants, such as 
corn, in addition to the decreasing use of pesticides). 
 179 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 145–46 (noting that the Court was following precedent 
set forth in Chakrabarty); Ma, supra note 136, at 698 (noting the effects of the Court’s decision in 
Chakrabarty). 
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II. MONSANTO 
A. The Emergence of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 
research within the field of plant varieties shifted from the public to the private 
sector due to the availability of utility patents for different varieties of genetic 
modification.180 By the mid-1990s, the private sector dominated research and 
investment in development for patents related to plant breeding.181 In fact, pri-
vate spending on research and development began to increase by more than ten 
times between 1960 and the 1980 Chakrabarty decision.182 The shift from pro-
tection under the PPA and the PVPA to patent protection also resulted in the 
increased use of licensing products, rather than sales.183 
Initially, numerous private companies seized the opportunity to capitalize 
on the Court’s decision in Chakrabarty.184 Due to the high costs of investing in 
research, however, many of these companies began to consolidate by the early 
1990s, resulting in frequent mergers.185 A handful of companies that special-
ized in developing seed varieties began to dominate the industry—including 
Monsanto.186 
By 1997, Monsanto became one of the four largest firms specializing in 
researching and developing seed varieties.187 Less than a decade later, Monsan-
to owned 647 biotechnology patents.188 Despite concerns regarding the com-
pany’s dominance, many have welcomed its technology.189 For example, Mon-
                                                                                                                           
 180 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145–46 (2001); Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980); Lim, supra note 3, at 146; see U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB-
11, THE FIRST DECADE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006) 
[hereinafter U.S.D.A. REPORT] (noting the increased investment in research and development within 
the seed industry). 
 181 See U.S.D.A. REPORT, supra note 180, at 2 (noting that private companies and individuals 
owned three quarters of all patents relating to plant breeds). 
 182 See id. 
 183 See Lim, supra note 3, at 147. This shift is notable because it began normalizing the idea that 
seed saving, which was once common in the agricultural industry, could be considered patent in-
fringement. Id. at 147–48; Ma, supra note 136, at 694–95. 
 184 U.S.D.A. REPORT, supra note 180, at 2. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 2–3; Ma, supra note 136, at 694. Private research and development firms also began to 
consolidate due to advancements in the biological sciences. U.S.D.A. REPORT, supra note 180, at 2–3. 
For example, by combining firms that develop products that complement one another, they can be 
sold under one umbrella, thereby reducing costs. Id. 
 187 U.S.D.A. REPORT, supra note 180, at 3. 
 188 Ma, supra note 136, at 700. 
 189 See Brief of American Soybean Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 315223, at *18 [hereinafter 
American Soybean Association Amicus Brief]; Lim, supra note 3, at 134–35 (noting that Monsanto’s 
dominance has led to antitrust issues). In its amicus brief, the American Soybean Association detailed 
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santo’s Roundup Ready soybeans became commercially available in 1996 and 
remain one of the company’s most successful products.190 
B. Roundup Ready 
Roundup Ready is an herbicide that includes the chemical glyphosate.191 
The chemical prevents vegetation such as weeds from growing without inter-
fering with crops.192 It facilitates farming because it can be used at all stages of 
growth and does not interfere with farming techniques.193 Monsanto encour-
ages farmers to pair Roundup Ready herbicide with Roundup Ready seeds in 
order to create glyphosate-resistant crops.194 This allows the plant to grow 
without interruption from the chemical.195 
The intersection between technological advancement and the right to con-
trol the use of intellectual property has been a point of contention.196 To use 
Roundup Ready or Roundup Ready seeds, purchasers must agree to the “Mon-
santo Technology/Stewardship Agreement.”197 The most controversial clause 
within the agreement pertains to single-season planting, which prohibits farmers 
from saving the Roundup Ready seeds for future crops.198 Farmers who violate 
                                                                                                                           
the immense growth of the soybean industry. American Soybean Association Amicus Brief, supra, at 
6. Further, between 1998 and 2012, the amount of farmers taking advantage of the glyphosate-
resistant soybeans increased from thirty-eight percent to ninety-three percent. Id. at 18; Lim, supra 
note 3, at 570. Specifically hoping to counter the theory that farmers would oppose companies such as 
Monsanto, the organization stressed the adverse effects that weak patent law protection could have on 
soybean farmers, such as complex licensing and contract agreements that would likely proliferate 
without the protection. American Soybean Association Amicus Brief, supra, at 7. 
 190 See American Soybean Association Amicus Brief, supra note 189, at 18 (describing the 
growth of Monsanto’s seed technology); Lim, supra note 3, at 134–35 (noting allegations against 
Monsanto relating to antitrust violations and illegal licensing schemes); Ma, supra note 136, at 700 
(noting Monsanto’s aggressive litigation strategies involving hundreds of suits against farmers). 
 191 Lim, supra note 28, at 569. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See id. (summarizing the process and benefits of Roundup Ready technology); Ma, supra note 
136, at 701 (noting the benefits of using both Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds in conjunction). 
 195 Lim, supra note 28, at 569. Because a resistance to glyphosate does not affect the gene se-
quence, the seed can maintain the requisite sugar-conversion processes necessary for the cell’s devel-
opment. Id. 
 196 See American Soybean Association Amicus Brief, supra note 189, at 18 (noting that nearly all 
farmers have taken advantage of Monsanto’s plant technology related to soybeans); Ma, supra note 
136, at 700 (detailing the controversial tactics employed by Monsanto against allegedly patent-
infringing farmers who have saved seeds in violation of licensing agreements). By 2007, Monsanto 
obtained judgments in its favor totaling twenty million dollars. Ma, supra note 136, at 700. 
 197 Lim, supra note 28, at 570; Ma, supra note 136, at 701. 
 198 See Lim, supra note 28, at 570 (noting that whether Monsanto licensed its technology or sold 
it, use of its product required adherence to its restrictions); Ma, supra note 136, at 700–01 (noting that 
many of Monsanto’s lawsuits are based on violations of its restrictions). 
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this restriction are considered patent infringers.199 Pursuant to this clause, Mon-
santo has brought over a hundred lawsuits against individual farmers.200 
C. Patent Infringement and “Innocent Infringers” 
Parker v. Hulme was one of the earliest cases to directly address the issue 
of intent in patent infringement.201 In Parker, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered an infringement claim brought by 
the inventors of an advanced method that used hydraulic power.202 The court 
characterized the defendant’s knowledge and intent as irrelevant, thereby es-
tablishing that patent infringers were subject to strict liability.203 The current 
statutory language on patent infringement supports this standard because it 
does not make any reference to the necessary mental state to find that in-
fringement has occurred.204 Other courts followed Parker and applied the strict 
liability standard in patent infringement cases.205 
The idea of “innocent infringers” stems from the historical idea that pa-
tent infringement does not require intent or knowledge.206 Sometimes charac-
                                                                                                                           
 199 Ma, supra note 136, at 700. 
 200 Id. The opposition to the agreements Monsanto requires farmers to sign is partially based on 
the fact that the restrictions run directly counter to historical agricultural techniques of seed saving, 
which allows Monsanto to dominate the industry. Id. at 701–02; see Pollack, supra note 1 (noting that 
a victory for Bowman would loosen Monsanto’s grip on farmers and the overall industry). 
 201 18 F.Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849); see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort 
Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571, 578 (2016) (tracing the lack of knowledge or intent require-
ments in patent infringement to Parker v. Hulme). 
 202 Parker, 18 F.Cas. at 1140. 
 203 See id. at 1143. The defendant argued that he was not aware of Parker’s invention. Id. at 1142. 
The court rejected this argument and set forth what it considered to be the only important questions 
when determining whether there is patent infringement: (1) whether the patented invention was actual-
ly produced and used, and (2) whether the use of the invention was in accordance with the patent’s 
characteristics. Id. at 1143; see Lee v. Accessories by Peak, 705 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 
2010) (finding that patent infringement is a two-step process requiring the courts to establish what the 
scope of the patent is, depending on the construction of the patentee’s claims, and then compare the 
claims to the infringing use or invention in question). 
 204 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see Holman, supra note 3, at 700 (explaining that the statute’s 
silence on whether intent or knowledge is required to be held liable for patent infringement leaves 
open the door for the courts to interpret as such, at least with respect to self-replicating technologies). 
 205 See Vishnubhakat, supra note 201, at 578. Albert Walker published one of the first treatises on 
patent law in 1883 and described the theory that patent infringement does not require intent or 
knowledge as one that is firmly established. Id.; see Potter Voice Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 24 F. 
Supp. 3d 882, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that intent is not necessary for patent infringement, it is 
only relevant to the calculation of damages which can be multiplied threefold if there is a finding of 
willfulness). 
 206 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (providing for the conduct that constitutes patent infringement but not 
the requisite mental state); Holman, supra note 3, at 700 (noting the statute’s silence on what consti-
tutes intent or knowledge); Shené Mitchell, Organic Crops, Genetic Drift, and Commingling: Theo-
ries of Remedy and Defense, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 313, 317–18 (2013) (noting that a patent infring-
er’s intent is immaterial to liability). 
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terized as a myth, an innocent infringement is one that occurs without the 
knowledge of the alleged infringer.207 One of the primary ways innocent in-
fringement may occur is through “genetic drift.”208 Genetic drift is when the 
genetic material of Roundup Ready seeds migrates through pollination and 
subsequently contaminates other crops.209 Another way innocent infringement 
can occur is through cross-fertilization.210 This occurs when a non-patented 
plant breed pollinates a patented breed.211 Ultimately, the patent regime is in-
centive-based and designed to protect the inventor’s creation even if, like 
Roundup Ready, it has the ability to drift and contaminate other crops.212 This 
leaves unwitting infringers vulnerable because a defense setting forth a lack of 
intent or knowledge would likely fail in court.213 
The issue of genetic drift can be traced to an incident in 1998 where a 
Texas organic farmer’s crops were contaminated through cross-pollination 
from a nearby field of genetically modified corn.214 Similarly, in 2004, a Cana-
dian farmer alleged that he was a victim of innocent infringement because a 
Monsanto truck carrying genetically modified seeds spilled onto his farm and 
contaminated canola crops.215 Others argue that innocent infringement is just a 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Holman, supra note 3, at 681 (finding that the popular theory that Monsanto is suing 
farmers on the basis of innocent infringement is not supported by evidence); Ma, supra note 136, at 
703 (defining an inadvertent infringer in the context of Monsanto as someone who saves and replants 
seeds contaminated by Monsanto’s technology through environmental processes). 
 208 See Mitchell, supra note 206, at 317 (noting the risk of genetic drift to organic farmers who 
need to ensure that their crops do not contain GMOs); Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: 
Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 
585, 585–86 (2000) (describing early warnings from farm groups of the potential threat of genetic 
drift and how it could affect farmers in the future). 
 209 See Ma, supra note 136, at 703 (noting that genetic drift can occur without a farmer’s 
knowledge through environmental processes such as gusts of air, creatures, and other plants); Mitch-
ell, supra note 206, at 317 (noting that genetic drift through natural processes poses a significant 
threat to organic farmers); Repp, supra note 208, at 585–86 (describing the greatest threat of in-
fringement liability and other far reaching consequences as the potential for genetically modified 
crops commingling with non-genetically modified crops). 
 210 Mitchell, supra note 206, at 317. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See id. (describing the patent regime as one that is inherently designed to protect the patent 
holder and ill-equipped to handle issues such as genetic drift); Repp, supra note 208, at 598 (describ-
ing how the qualities of genetically modified plant varieties create uncertainty in the courts). 
 213 Mitchell, supra note 206, at 317. 
 214 Repp, supra note 208, at 591. 
 215 See Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 904 (Can.) (finding that 
Schmeiser was liable for patent infringement because he should have been aware of the contamination 
and by saving the seed he used Monsanto’s seed technology without authority); Holman, supra note 3, 
at 681–82 (noting that a close look at Schmeiser’s case proves that he was likely not a genuine inno-
cent infringer); Mitchell, supra note 206, at 319 (discussing the Court’s conclusion that Schmeiser 
should have known that the seeds included Monsanto’s technology). Canola crops are plants that pro-
duce small yellow flowers and belong to the same family as mustard, broccoli, brussel sprouts, and 
cauliflower. What Is Canola?, U.S. CANOLA ASS’N, http://www.uscanola.com/what-is-canola/ 
[https://perma.cc/37F6-YQPX]. 
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myth.216 In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed doubt that genetic 
drift occurred in the 2004 case.217 
Despite this, the issue of innocent infringement has become more appar-
ent, particularly when the OSGA and numerous organizations brought suit 
against Monsanto based on the theory of genetic drift in 2012.218 OSGA sought 
to bar Monsanto from bringing any patent infringement claims due to the in-
creasing probability that genetic drift would occur.219 Ultimately, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the organizations did not 
have standing to bring suit because it was not certain that innocent infringe-
ment would occur due to genetic drift.220 Underlying the court’s decision was 
Monsanto’s assurance that it would not sue farmers with traces of less than one 
percent of Roundup Ready technology in their crops.221 
Despite the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in 
Organic Seed Growers Association & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. and Mon-
santo’s commitment, the issue remains unresolved.222 Ultimately, Monsanto’s 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See Holman, supra note 3, at 681 (finding that the popular theory that Monsanto is suing 
farmers on the basis of innocent infringement is not supported by evidence); Ma, supra note 136, at 
703 (defining an inadvertent infringer in the context of Monsanto as someone who saves and replants 
seeds contaminated by Monsanto’s technology through environmental processes). 
 217 See Holman, supra note 3, at 681–82. According to Professor Holman, the Supreme Court of 
Canada found Schmeiser’s accusations against Monsanto meritless because he took affirmative steps 
to engage in activity that infringed on Monsanto’s patent. Id. 
 218 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
see Holman, supra note 3, at 681 (noting that the idea of innocent infringers may be based on a false-
hood). The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment from the court asking Monsanto to promise to not 
hold farmers liable for patent infringement where there was a lack of knowledge or intent of the viola-
tion. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1353. The Federal Circuit ultimately ruled 
that the plaintiffs did not have standing since they failed to allege concrete harm. Id. at 1361. 
 219 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1354. Monsanto has been well-
documented as preferring to use the courts as a way to hold farmers accountable for patent infringe-
ment. Ma, supra note 136, at 700. As of 2007, there were 112 lawsuits filed against farmers, resulting 
in damages of more than twenty million dollars for Monsanto. Id. This number is likely greater as an 
estimated 700 potential suits were settled out of court. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 
F.3d at 1353; Ma, supra note 136, at 700. As of 2016, according to the Monsanto website, the compa-
ny has filed 147 lawsuits. See Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://monsanto.com/company/media/statements/saving-seeds/ [https://perma.cc/6X59-
VG2Y]. In response to the suit brought by the Organic Seed Grower’s Association, Monsanto directed 
the plaintiffs to its commitment on its website. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 
1354. Monsanto’s commitment explicitly promises that it will not sue farmers based on trace amounts 
of its technology in contaminated crops. Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO 
(Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx [https://
perma.cc/C4HQ-CTZ6 ] [hereinafter Monsanto’s Commitment]. 
 220 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n, 718 F.3d at 1360 (finding that where the plaintiffs 
could not show that inadvertent infringement had actually occurred through genetic drift or was cer-
tain to happen, there was no case or controversy for the court to resolve). 
 221 Id. at 1358; Monsanto’s Commitment, supra note 219. 
 222 See Lim, supra note 28, at 597 (discussing the threats farmers still face in being held liable for 
patent infringement despite Monsanto’s agreement). 
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control over the seed industry drastically increases the probability that inno-
cent infringers will be held liable.223 Further, Monsanto’s commitment is lim-
ited and did not directly address whether it would waive liability for crop con-
tamination above the one percent trace levels.224 
D. The Supreme Court Revisits the Exhaustion Doctrine in  
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. represents the peak of the exhaustion doctrine’s 
development. 225 Vernon Hugh Bowman was a small-scale farmer from Indi-
ana.226 Beginning in 1999, he procured seeds that contained the Roundup 
Ready technology for his first crop.227 He also bought seeds from a grain ele-
vator for second-crop planting, which occurred later in the season.228 Seeds 
from grain elevators, also known as commodity seeds, served as a way to miti-
gate the costs of what Bowman considered a riskier late-season crop.229 
Rather than paying more money to purchase another set of Roundup 
Ready seeds, Bowman combined the saved seeds from the first crop and the 
commodity seeds from the grain elevators and later replanted them.230 Bow-
man knew that many of the commodity seeds from the grain elevator could 
contain the resistant technology found in Roundup Ready seeds.231 He there-
fore sprayed the Roundup Ready herbicide on his crops to eliminate the seeds 
without the technology.232 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See id. (recognizing the possibility of innocent infringement, which even Monsanto acknowl-
edged). 
 224 See Holman, supra note 3, at 687 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s mention of Monsanto’s 
cautious statements that did not completely eliminate the potential of lawsuits against farmers who 
contained crop contamination). 
 225 See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1761 (2013) (emphasizing the enduring role 
of the exhaustion doctrine); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 145 (concluding that hybrid corn 
seeds are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (concluding 
that a broad interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 was appropriate given the statute’s language and legisla-
tive intent); U.S.D.A REPORT, supra note 208, at 2 (summarizing the exponential growth of the bio-
technology agricultural sector in the time period after the decisions in Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. and the resulting domination by a few companies). 
 226 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768. 
 227 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1761 
(2013). 
 228 Id. Grain elevators are facilities that sell soybean seeds to large groups for the utilization of 
individuals or animals. Brief of CropLife America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 3, 
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796), 2013 WL 314456, at *3. Grain elevators generally do not sell 
seeds to farmers for cultivation purposes. Id. 
 229 Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1345. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 1345–46. 
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Starting in 2000, Bowman continued this practice openly until Monsanto 
sued him for patent infringement in 2007.233 The Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Monsanto’s favor was twofold.234 First, building upon the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the court characterized 
the sale of the Roundup Ready seeds as a “conditional sale.”235 The condition 
was that Bowman was to only use the seeds for the current season.236 Also, 
Monsanto reserved control over what Bowman did with the seed, including 
replication of its properties.237 Second, even if the exhaustion doctrine could 
apply to Bowman’s conduct, the resultant crops from the replanted seeds creat-
ed a newly infringing article.238 
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the case centered on how far the 
exhaustion doctrine extended.239 The Court emphasized that, though an author-
ized sale exhausts the patent holder’s rights, the doctrine does not give users 
the ability to make a new article.240 Nevertheless, Bowman argued that, in re-
planting Roundup Ready seeds, he was merely farming.241 He stressed that the 
general purpose of seeds is to use them in planting.242 He therefore claimed 
that his conduct was a permissible use rather than a reproduction, or making, 
of a new article.243 Bowman also argued that, because soybeans were self-
replicating, it was the beans themselves that created the infringing article—not 
Bowman.244 Ultimately, the Court rejected these arguments as an attempt to 
impermissibly extend the exhaustion doctrine and held in Monsanto’s favor.245 
                                                                                                                           
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 1347–48 (concluding that the sale of Roundup Ready seeds to Bowman was a condition-
al sale and that even if Monsanto’s patent rights were exhausted, Bowman’s conduct created a newly 
infringing article); Lim, supra note 28, at 571. 
 235 Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1347; Lim, supra note 28, at 571; see Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medi-
part, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that the sale of the patented apparatuses was a 
conditional sale requiring purchasers to dispose of the product after a single use). 
 236 Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1347. 
 237 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764–65; Lim, supra note 28, at 570–71. 
 238 Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1348 (finding that crops from replanted seed are analogous to cop-
ies of the initial seed); Lim, supra note 28, at 571 (noting that the lack of an authorized sale contribut-
ed to the exhaustion doctrine’s inapplicability). 
 239 Lim, supra note 28, at 571; see Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (concluding that the exhaustion 
doctrine would not apply to the additional soybeans grown without Monsanto’s consent). 
 240 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. 
 241 Id. at 1768; see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 424 (1964) (concluding that the 
exclusive right of “making” requires that the invention’s users are not allowed to copy it). 
 242 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. 
 243 Id. at 1768–69. 
 244 Id. at 1768. 
 245 Id. 
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III. REDEFINING MAKING 
The exhaustion doctrine’s significance lies in its ability to restrict the con-
trol patent holders have over their inventions after they are sold.246 From Ad-
ams v. Burke to Bowman v. Monsanto Co., courts have attempted to balance 
patent holders’s interests against those of subsequent purchasers or users.247 
Patent protection is designed to incentivize inventors with a temporary mo-
nopoly.248 Courts, however, have consistently held that, once full compensation 
is received, further protection in the form of exclusive rights is unnecessary.249 
Ultimately, the invention of self-replicating technologies forced the courts to 
reexamine these longstanding principles.250 
A. The Court in Bowman Left the Relationship Between the Exhaustion 
Doctrine and the Definition of “Making” Unresolved 
To find that Bowman made another article, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bowman focused heavily on the amount of labor that Bowman put into har-
vesting the Roundup Ready seeds he obtained from the grain elevator.251 Alt-
hough the Court was presented with a naturally self-replicating product, it 
highlighted the various steps Bowman took to reconstruct Monsanto’s technol-
ogy.252 Rejecting Bowman’s attempt to shift culpability to the seeds, the Court 
detailed his purchase of the seeds, use of the Roundup Ready herbicide, seed 
saving, replanting, and harvesting.253 
Recognizing self-replicating technologies as new territory under the pa-
tent regime and the unique facts presented in Bowman, the Court left the door 
open as to what “making” could be defined as.254 The Court narrowed its con-
clusion to the specific facts of the case, acknowledging that there may be in-
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013) (emphasizing the standard of the 
exhaustion doctrine); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (finding that the 
sale of the microprocessors and chipsets served as an authorized sale to which the exhaustion doctrine 
was applicable); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942) (emphasizing that, 
where a sale of an article encompasses the fundamental elements, the patent holder’s rights are ex-
hausted). 
 247 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (establishing that the exhaustion doctrine limits the patent 
holder’s rights); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) (noting that, despite the privi-
leges afforded to patent holders, their rights are limited once an adequate reward is given). 
 248 Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. 
 249 See id. (describing the exhaustion doctrine’s rationale); Adams, 84 U.S. at 456 (noting that, 
despite the privileges afforded to patent holders, their rights are limited once an adequate reward is 
given). 
 250 See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (noting that the increasingly complex nature of self-
replicating technologies may lead the Court to rule differently in subsequent cases). 
 251 See id. at 1765 (describing Bowman’s conduct step-by-step). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 1769. 
 254 Id. 
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stances in the future when an alleged infringer does not undertake labor or 
conduct that is significant enough to scrutinize.255 The Court further recog-
nized that self-replication of an article outside an unsuspecting user’s control 
might be beyond the exhaustion doctrine’s scope.256 
Bowman left the relationship between the exhaustion doctrine, self-
replicating technologies, and the definition of “making” in limbo.257 This is 
significant for two reasons.258 First, it allows “making” to be defined in a way 
that will be unified and concrete.259 Second, it sets the stage for the protection 
of innocent infringers accused of making an article.260 
B. Proposed Resolutions and Why They Are Flawed 
There have been a number of proposed solutions to the problem of self-
replicating technologies and the threat to innocent infringers.261 These solu-
tions include expanding the use of contract law or property law in the seed in-
dustry or applying copyright regimes.262 Ultimately, these solutions are inade-
quate because they undercut the incentives that are essential to patent law.263 
Bowman set forth a number of arguments to avoid liability.264 One argu-
ment was that contract law could be an alternative to the licensing schemes 
that Monsanto already had in place.265 He argued that, through a contract pro-
vision, companies like Monsanto could require farmers to sell resulting seeds 
to grain elevator operators who have agreed not to harvest them in subsequent 
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2018] Integrating Self-Replicating Technologies 417 
seasons.266 This provision would prevent Monsanto’s technology from mixing 
with other crops since the seeds would need to remain distinctly identifiable.267 
Administrative issues ultimately make such contractual methods an un-
workable solution to self-replicating technologies.268 The most significant is-
sue is that, although Monsanto would have a contractual agreement with the 
farmer-purchaser, it would not have contractual privity with subsequent proge-
ny seed-purchasers.269 Consequently, grain elevator operators would be free to 
use the seeds in any manner they deem fit.270 Monsanto and other seed compa-
nies would therefore have to enter into a contract with each subsequent pur-
chaser.271 Additionally, contract law poses a threat to the incentives afforded by 
patent law.272 That is, patentees would only be able to profit from first genera-
tion seeds.273 
Another suggestion is to apply property law principles to the exhaustion 
doctrine for self-replicating technologies, but similar problems arise.274 In 
Bowman, the farmer argued that the exhaustion doctrine should be extended to 
second-generation seeds due to the inherent nature of self-replicating technol-
ogy.275 Bowman likened the ability of Monsanto to prevent farmers from re-
planting second-generation seeds for subsequent harvests as a restraint on per-
sonal property.276 By restraining use of the article, courts allowed companies to 
exert control after the authorized sale.277 The U.S. Supreme Court was swift in 
rejecting this expansion of the exhaustion doctrine.278 The Court ultimately 
concluded in Bowman that any interpretation that modified the exhaustion doc-
trine would threaten incentives to innovate.279 
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Copyright law’s notice-and-takedown regime has also been suggested, 
although it would likely pose the same administrative issues as contract law.280 
When Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, it sought to 
resolve the liability that occurred through innocent infringement of copyright-
ed work, acknowledging that new technologies were incompatible with the 
traditional copyright regime.281 For example, Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) can host copyrightable material through user-uploaded content.282 
Consequently, such ISPs faced potential copyright infringement liability as 
they became increasingly popular.283 To combat this issue, the notice-and-
takedown regime requires ISPs to remove any infringing work from their web-
site once notified.284 
This same notice-and-takedown regime could be applied to farmers who 
have inadvertently infringed on Monsanto’s technology.285 While this regime 
would likely preserve the incentives to continue developing different seed va-
rieties, it would be difficult to implement.286 Biotechnology companies would 
have to invest a significant amount of time and money in discovering infring-
ing crops and notifying the farmers.287 Further, it is uncertain how the infring-
ing articles would be removed from a crop.288 
C. How Redefining “Making” with a Focus on Knowledge  
Can Help Innocent Infringers 
Simply put, “making” should be redefined and interpreted in a way that 
will shield innocent infringers from patent infringement liability.289 Although 
Bowman serves as the seminal case that brought the issue of innocent in-
fringement to the forefront, Bowman’s conduct differs from the kind of activity 
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a new definition of making would protect.290 Bowman was fully aware that he 
was replanting seeds with the Roundup Ready technology and his intentions to 
usurp Monsanto’s restrictions were deliberate over a seven-year period.291 In 
contrast, innocent infringers are not knowingly or intentionally engaging in 
activity that they know to be infringing but rather, they are virtually unaware 
that their conduct is creating infringement liability.292 The key issue is that, 
under the current legal framework, both Bowman and an innocent infringer 
will be held liable for patent infringement despite the stark differences in their 
actions.293 
By redefining “making” to ensure that only deliberate conduct such as 
Bowman’s will be considered patent infringement, it resolves two major is-
sues: first, innocent infringers will not be held liable for conduct they are una-
ware of, and second, both the exhaustion doctrine and patent policy goals will 
remain intact.294 
D. A New Definition of Making 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271, an individual who makes any patented invention 
infringes upon the patent.295 In Bowman, one of the key issues was whether 
Bowman’s act of reproducing a second generation of seeds could constitute 
“making.”296 One problem was that it was possible to argue that the replication 
of soybeans was a natural and independent process.297 If so, Bowman did not 
actually make the soybeans and, therefore, did not infringe on Monsanto’s pa-
tent.298 Although the Court did not explicitly define what making means under 
the statute, it referenced the dictionary definition and took care to detail all of 
Bowman’s steps in replicating the soybeans to find that this activity constituted 
making.299 This undertaking, however, still leaves a number of issues unre-
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solved.300 Specifically, it is unclear whether “making” requires only that the in-
fringer engaged in some sort of conduct involving labor in the process of repro-
ducing the article in question, or only that the article was actually reproduced.301 
A new definition of making would require evidence that the alleged in-
fringer engaged in a level of willful conduct.302 This distinction is particularly 
relevant when it comes to self-replicating technologies because of their unique 
ability to reproduce on their own.303 Generally, in most patent infringement 
cases, whether the product in question was made is not an issue.304 As self-
replicating technologies become increasingly advanced, this distinction will 
become important with respect to patent infringement.305 
Further, this new definition of making will successfully integrate self-
replicating technologies into the exhaustion doctrine without having to create 
an exception.306 Under the exhaustion doctrine, the patent holder no longer has 
any rights to the product once a valid sale is made.307 However, under the pro-
posed definition of making, willful conduct would fall within the infringement 
statute and would therefore be outside the scope of the exhaustion doctrine.308 
Because innocent infringers would not have the requisite knowledge to be held 
liable for patent infringement under this clarified definition of making, the ex-
haustion doctrine would remain intact.309 Preserving the exhaustion doctrine 
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will also mean that the goals of patent law will be sustained.310 By ensuring 
that those who knowingly infringe on a patent cannot escape liability through 
the exhaustion doctrine, patent holders will continue to be incentivized to in-
novate.311 
CONCLUSION 
 The exhaustion doctrine establishes the right to use or resell a patented 
article after an authorized sale. Despite the principle’s historical roots, it has 
contracted and expanded as courts have tried to maintain the goals of patent 
law: to allow patent holders to receive their full reward and encourage innova-
tion. Self-replicating technologies, specifically in the context of plant varieties, 
posed a challenge as to what legal protection these technologies should re-
ceive. Slowly, through various legislative acts and judicial intervention, the 
agricultural biotechnology industry saw increased legal protection and, ulti-
mately, patent protection. 
Patent protection encouraged significant investment in research and de-
velopment by industry giants such as Monsanto. Given the substantial amount 
of money that is required to develop seed technology, patent protection gave 
companies the necessary incentive to engage in this endeavor. As Monsanto’s 
technology achieved widespread use, the company’s litigation against patent 
infringers became an increasing concern. The ability of Roundup Ready seeds 
to easily contaminate crops led to the belief that farmers may be held liable as 
innocent infringers. This rationale was rooted in the strict liability interpreta-
tion courts gave to the patent infringement statute, which did not require in-
fringers to have any knowledge or intent to be held accountable. 
Bowman v. Monsanto exemplified how courts deal with patent infringe-
ment and the exhaustion doctrine in the context of self-replicating technolo-
gies. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in deciding not to extend 
the exhaustion doctrine to the act of making another article. However, the nar-
rower question remained: whether Bowman’s knowledge of his actions deter-
mined whether he made the article. If not, a decision concluding that his 
knowledge was irrelevant had the potential to leave innocent infringers vulner-
able. 
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Ultimately, redefining “making” to require the infringer to have 
knowledge will protect those who have crops that were inadvertently contami-
nated with patented technology. Infringers such as Bowman, who knowingly 
circumvent patent law, will still be held responsible. This will ensure that pa-
tent holders remain incentivized and receive the appropriate compensation for 
their inventions and the courts can avoid expanding or creating exceptions to 
the exhaustion doctrine. Further, the proposed definition of “making” would 
provide increasing clarity and predictability in the law. 
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